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 II.-213 
AN INSUFFICIENT SCREENING: THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MICHIGAN’S 
NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM 
Abstract: In June 2019, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kanuszewski v. 
Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, declined to answer wheth-
er Michigan’s mandatory newborn screening program violated parents’ funda-
mental rights to control the medical care of their children, as well as whether the 
screening constituted an unconstitutional infringement of their children’s Fourth 
Amendment protections. As a matter of first impression, the Sixth Circuit dis-
missed these claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity, declining to exer-
cise its discretion to answer the underlying constitutional claims. Although the 
Sixth Circuit correctly dismissed the defendants on qualified immunity grounds, 
it missed an opportunity to answer constitutional questions bearing on the effec-
tiveness of Michigan’s public health policy. This Comment argues that Michigan 
has not sufficiently narrowly tailored its mandatory newborn screening program to 
its purported goal of protecting the health and well-being of its newest citizens. 
INTRODUCTION 
Every newborn baby in Michigan, ideally within twenty-four to thirty-six 
hours of birth, undergoes statutorily mandated blood screening.1 Under penalty 
of misdemeanor, a health professional must collect a few drops of blood from 
the baby’s heel and then send the sample to the Michigan Department of Health 
and Human Services to be tested for over fifty different disorders.2 The profes-
sionals conduct the initial blood draws and subsequent testing without parental 
consent; the statute expressly rejects any informed consent requirements.3 
The Sixth Circuit considered the constitutionality of Michigan’s newborn 
screening program in 2019 in Kanuszewski v. Michigan Department of Health 
                                                                                                                           
 1 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5431(1) (2018); Michigan Newborn Screening Questions and An-
swers, MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-
73971_4911_4916-233319—,00.html#How_many_babies_are_found [https://perma.cc/6GVJ-3VW2] 
[hereinafter Screening Questions and Answers]. 
 2 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5431(5); Disorder List, MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdch/NBS_Disorder_List_1106_181347_7.pdf; Screening 
Questions and Answers, supra note 1. 
 3 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5431(2). The newborn screening statute defines informed consent by 
reference to a broader predictive genetic testing statute. Id. § 333.5431(2) n.1. Informed consent re-
quires that a patient or the patient’s legal guardian sign a written document signifying that the physi-
cian adequately explained the effectiveness, impact, and purpose of the test, as well as who can access 
the results and any potential uses for the results. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17020(2). 
II.-214 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
& Human Services (Kanuszewski II).4 Parents of infants born in Michigan 
challenged the initial blood draws and testing, among other components of 
Michigan’s newborn screening program, for impermissibly bypassing their 
consent.5 They contended that Michigan’s program violated not only their fun-
damental rights to direct the medical care of their children, but also their new-
born infants’ Fourth Amendment rights.6 
Part I of this Comment introduces the facts of Kanuszewski II, as well as 
background legal principles implicated by the asserted constitutional viola-
tions.7 Part II closely examines the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ handling of 
two constitutional questions regarding Michigan’s newborn screening pro-
gram: the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment claims and the infants’ Fourth 
Amendment claims.8 Lastly, Part III discusses the Sixth Circuit’s missed op-
portunity to address the merits of the constitutional claims, and argues that 
Michigan’s screening program may not be sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
meet its compelling interest of protecting its citizens’ health and well-being.9 
I. LEGAL CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK OF KANUSZEWSKI II 
Section A of this Part will first provide the procedural and factual context of 
Kanuszewski II.10 Next, this Part will describe the legal landscape in relation to 
the different constitutional issues in Kanuszewski II.11 More specifically, Section 
B will discuss parents’ fundamental rights to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren, Section C will describe blood draws as they relate to the Fourth Amend-
ment as well as a “special needs” test applied in non-law enforcement situations, 
and finally Section D will outline the doctrine of qualified immunity.12 
A. Procedural History and Factual Background of Kanuszewski II 
The State of Michigan operates a newborn screening program, originating 
in the 1960s, that statutorily mandates health professionals to take blood sam-
                                                                                                                           
 4 927 F.3d 396, 403–04 (6th Cir. 2019) (Kanuszewski II) 
 5 Id.; Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 333 F. Supp. 3d 716, 719 (E.D. 
Mich. 2018) (Kanuszewski I). The parents also challenged the storage of their infants’ blood samples 
and expressed fear that the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services might sell the blood 
samples in the future. Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 404. 
 6 Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 405; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law . . . .”). 
 7 See infra notes 13–44 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 45–68 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 69–102 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–21 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 23–44 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 23–44 and accompanying text. 
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ples from newborn babies to test for various diseases.13 After being tested, the 
blood samples are transferred to the Michigan Neonatal Bank and stored “in-
definitely” for testing and further research.14 The plaintiffs in Kanuszewski II 
were three parents, suing as parent-guardians to their minor children, asserting 
they did not know of, nor consent to, Michigan’s testing and subsequent stor-
age of their newborns’ blood.15 
The plaintiffs initially brought five counts against the Michigan Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, as well as various individuals in their 
official and individual capacities (collectively, the defendants) alleging that: (I) 
the defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests to refuse, 
on behalf of their children, unwanted medical procedures by drawing blood 
without parental consent; (II) their consent was incomplete, or otherwise im-
properly and falsely obtained; (III) the defendants violated their Fourth 
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when 
the defendants conducted the initial extraction and seizure for testing without 
parental consent; and (IV/V) the defendants indefinitely stored the infants’ 
                                                                                                                           
 13 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5431. Michigan is not unique in this regard; every state has imple-
mented some variation of a newborn screening program. See Sonia M. Suter, Did You Give the Gov-
ernment Your Baby’s DNA? Rethinking Consent in Newborn Screening, 15 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 
729, 737 (2014) (providing an overview of newborn screening in the United States). Every state tests 
for at least twenty-nine conditions, and Michigan tests for over fifty. Id.; Disorder List, MICH. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdch/NBS_Disorder_List_
1106_181347_7.pdf; Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 12, Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 
2019) (No. 18-1896) (supporting Michigan’s program by highlighting nationwide newborn screening 
requirements). The Michigan statute rejects any informed consent requirements for its mandatory 
screening tests. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5431(1)–(2). This “mandatory without exception” require-
ment is “one extreme,” and violation of the statute is a misdemeanor. Id. § 333.5431(5); see Suter, 
supra, at 746–47 (identifying “mandatory without exception” screening state statutes and state statutes 
requiring affirmative parental consent as the two extremes of newborn screening statutes). Many states 
employ an “opt-out” approach in which no affirmative parental consent is required. Suter, supra, at 
746–47. In states where testing is not mandatory, although many states permit parents to opt out of 
testing on any basis, some states restrict opting out to religious reasons only. Id. In Michigan, some 
families must pay for the newborn screening program themselves. Michigan Newborn Screening, 
MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., (Sept. 2017), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/
newborn_screening_broc_110897_7.pdf (explaining that the hospital charge incorporates the cost of 
Michigan’s newborn screening program). 
 14 Appellants’ Brief at 14, Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d 396 (No. 18-1896). 
 15 Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 403; Corrected Complaint ¶¶ 3–4, Kanuszewski I, 333 F. Supp. 3d 
716 (No. 1:18-cv-10472-TLL-PTM). The record is unclear on whether the parents had the opportunity 
to opt out of donating the blood to further research. Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 404 n.3. After a new-
born screening test, parents may demand the disposal of their children’s leftover blood. State Defend-
ants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint at *8, Kanuszewski I, 333 F. Supp. 3d 716 (E.D. 
Mich. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-10472-TLL-PTM). Further, in 2010, Michigan implemented an “opt-in” 
consent process for parents to consent to their children’s blood being used for further research, but not 
for the screening itself. Id. Although the parents conceded that they may have consented to their chil-
dren’s blood being used for research, they contended that they nevertheless were not offered adequate 
information to provide informed consent. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 14, at 18. 
II.-216 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
blood without parental consent.16 The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, vari-
ous forms of prospective injunctive relief, and damages.17 The defendants sub-
sequently filed motions to dismiss, which the district court granted in full.18 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of each of the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment claims, 
except those involving the defendants’ continuing storage of the infants’ sam-
ples.19 The Sixth Circuit declined to determine whether the initial blood sam-
ples drawn from the infants violated the parents’ substantive due process 
rights, in light of the individual defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity 
for that claim.20 Similarly, the court did not opine on whether the mandatory 
initial blood draws violated the infants’ Fourth Amendment rights.21 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Kanuszewski I, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 719. The issue of whether the screening violated the infants’ 
Fourth Amendment rights was inexorably intertwined with the issue of parental consent. See 
Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 423 (framing the infants’ Fourth Amendment claims to account for paren-
tal consent). The Sixth Circuit made clear in a different discussion that infants cannot make their own 
medical decisions by virtue of being infants, and it is their parents that make these decisions on their 
behalf. Id. at 414–15 (exercising discretion to hold that the children’s substantive due process rights to 
direct their own medical care were not violated because children cannot take care of themselves). 
 17 Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 405 (requesting declaratory judgment that the defendants violated 
plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, injunctive relief to “stop illegal processes and 
procedures” and require destruction of blood samples along with any associated data obtained without 
parental consent, and damages for violation of the plaintiffs’ asserted constitutional rights).  
 18 Kanuszewski I, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 730. The state defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds 
that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, supra note 15, at *9. In addi-
tion, the state defendants maintained that the Eleventh Amendment barred each claim except those for 
prospective injunctive relief against the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, as well 
as individual defendants. Id. (arguing that “lawsuits against state officials in their official capacity are 
deemed to be lawsuits against the State itself and are also barred by the Eleventh amendment”). They 
also argued that qualified immunity barred damages against the individual defendants because there 
was no violation of clearly established constitutional rights. Id. 
 19 Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 421–22, 425–26. The Sixth Circuit began its opinion with an ex-
tensive discussion of the plaintiffs’ standing to bring the different claims. Id. at 405–12 (finding that 
for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments claims stemming from the initial blood draws, the children 
and parents had standing to seek only damages, and for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims 
stemming from ongoing storage of blood samples, the children and parents had standing to seek in-
junctive and declaratory relief as well as damages). The court then divided the claims for which the 
plaintiffs had standing into two groups, those relating to the Fourteenth Amendment and those to the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 412. From there, the court further separated the Fourteenth Amendment 
claims based on whether the claims stemmed from the alleged violation of the infants’ rights or the 
parents’ rights. Id. Finally, the court split the Fourth Amendment analysis into two parts, examining 
the initial blood draws independently of the ongoing blood sample retention. Id. at 422. The Sixth 
Circuit remanded for further review of what, if any, compelling interest the defendants had in ongoing 
storage of the infants’ blood. Id. at 421. The Sixth Circuit also instructed the parties to determine 
whether the parents had consented to further research on their infants’ blood after the initial screening. 
Id. at 420. If the parents did not provide informed consent, then the Sixth Circuit suggested that any 
ongoing storage or sale of the infants’ blood would violate the parents’ substantive due process rights. 
Id. 
 20 Id. at 416 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2008)) (declining to exercise discre-
tion in the context of qualified immunity because the initial screening did not clearly violate the par-
2020] The Constitutionality of Michigan’s Newborn Screening Program II.-217 
B. Parents’ Fundamental Rights to Make Decisions as to the “Care, 
Custody, and Control” of Their Children22 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution encom-
passes both procedural and substantive due process.23 The substantive compo-
nent protects “certain fundamental rights and liberty interests” from govern-
mental intrusion.24 In 1923, in the case of Meyer v. Nebraska, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized parents’ fundamental liberty interests in the up-
bringing of their children.25 The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that, 
although not unfettered, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the 
“care, custody, and control of their children.”26 
                                                                                                                           
ents’ substantive due process rights). The court dismissed the claims against the state defendants with 
respect to constitutional claims connected to the initial blood draws because of state sovereign immun-
ity. Id. State sovereign immunity typically prevents plaintiffs from pursuing damages against states or 
“state agents and instrumentalities” in federal court. Id. at 413. 
 21 Id. at 423 (exercising discretion under the qualified immunity doctrine to not address whether 
Michigan’s newborn screening program unconstitutionally impinged on the infants’ Fourth Amend-
ment rights). The Sixth Circuit did note that the infants would be incapable of directing their own 
medical care. Id. at 414–15 (differentiating infants from competent individuals, who do have a funda-
mental right to refuse medical care). 
 22 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law . . . .”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997) (ex-
plaining that the Due Process Clause extends beyond simply procedural protections). 
 24 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. The substantive due process analysis focuses on defining “a nar-
row category of liberty interests that are deemed sufficiently ‘fundamental,’” and require any violation 
of such right to be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Ryan C. Williams, The One 
and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L. J. 408, 427 (2010). A fundamental right is 
one that is “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (citations omitted).  
 25 See generally 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (addressing whether parents have a liberty interest in 
directing the education of their children). The Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska addressed a stat-
ute forbidding children from learning any language other than English before completing the eighth 
grade. Id. at 396–97. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court opined that parents’ rights to 
allow a teacher to educate their children on a foreign language is a constitutionally protected liberty 
right. Id. at 400. 
 26 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (recognizing the history of the liberty interest). This fundamental liberty 
interest in a parent’s right to parent has been invoked in varying circumstances, including custody 
decisions, education, and commitment to a mental facility. See id. at 67 (holding a Washington statute 
allowing a court to disregard visitation decisions by fit parents too broad); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 
584, 603 (1979) (rejecting any presumption that a state agency’s substitute judgment is superior to 
that of a parent); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (addressing the liberty inter-
est in a right to parent in the context of education); see also Shmuel Bushwick, Note, Circumcision: 
Constitutionality, Decision Making Authority, and Suggestions for a Permissible Regulatory Frame-
work in Light of Attempts to Prohibit the Practice, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 11 (2012) (observ-
ing that courts show a heightened deference to parents in medical decisions). Despite this interest, the 
Court has recognized some boundaries. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) 
(providing examples of activities so important—such as compulsory school attendance or restrictions 
on compelled labor—that courts may appropriately restrict parental control); Jacobson v. Massachu-
II.-218 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
Courts will review alleged violations of fundamental liberty interests with 
strict scrutiny.27 Under this standard, a government action that infringes on 
constitutional rights will only be permissible if it is “narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest.”28 Pertinent to the state’s compelling interest, as it 
relates to the parent-child relationship, is its role as parens patriae.29 Pursuant 
to this doctrine, the state may act in a parental capacity in certain situations to 
ensure the best interests of the child.30 Parens patriae is not a catch-all justifi-
cation, however, and the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he child is not 
the mere creature of the State.”31 
C. Blood Draws and the Fourth Amendment 
Courts have on numerous occasions examined whether blood draws vio-
late the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.32 The Supreme Court has stated that blood draws constitute a search 
of the person under the Fourth Amendment.33 Although a warrantless search is 
                                                                                                                           
setts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (noting that the Constitution does not contemplate an unassailable right 
to total independence of the person in all situations). 
 27 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that statutes 
impinging on an individual’s constitutional rights will be “sustained only if they are suitably tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest”). 
 28 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); see Kevin M. Barry, The Death Penalty and the Fun-
damental Right to Life, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 1589–90 (2019) (noting that the Government bears the 
burden of establishing that the intrusion of a fundamental right passes strict scrutiny review). Additional-
ly, courts will find a statute insufficiently narrowly tailored where the statute is under-inclusive because, 
despite serving a permissible governmental aim, it does not “confer [the] same benefit or place [the] 
same burden” on individuals “similarly situated.” Note, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1076, 
1084 (1969).  
 29 See Suter, supra note 13, at 751 (explaining the rationale for parens patriae as a justification 
for newborn screening programs); Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The State and the 
Parent/Child Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 53 (2005) (chronicling the develop-
ment of parens patriae as it relates to the family); Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019) (“The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection for 
those unable to care for themselves.”). 
 30 See STEVEN OLSON & ADAM C. BERGER, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN USING RE-
SIDUAL NEWBORN SCREENING SAMPLES FOR TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH 7 (Inst. of Med. of the 
Nat’l Acads. ed., 2010) (arguing that the parens patriae doctrine justifies newborn screening pro-
grams because of the programs’ benefits for children); Suter, supra note 13, at 750 (describing that the 
state may use its authority under parens patriae where a child’s parents have failed to act in the best 
interest of their child). For further examples of when the Court has applied the parens patriae doc-
trine, see Thomas, supra note 29, at 53–54. 
 31 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
 32 See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has previously considered cases concerning whether a blood draw triggers Fourth Amendment 
protections). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (explicitly contemplating “the right of the people 
to be secure in their persons”). 
 33 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (2019) (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174). 
That a blood draw amounts to a search triggering the Fourth Amendment has been well settled since 
2020] The Constitutionality of Michigan’s Newborn Screening Program II.-219 
presumptively unreasonable, there are narrow exceptions.34 One such excep-
tion is when a search falls within the “special needs doctrine.”35 
The special needs doctrine applies in non-law enforcement situations 
where the government’s needs exceed an individual’s right to privacy, such as 
when a search is considered reasonable because a citizen’s well-being requires 
it.36 Where the government alleges a special need, courts balance the nature of 
the privacy interest and the intrusion against the nature of the government’s 
concerns.37 
                                                                                                                           
the Supreme Court decided in 1966, in Schmerber v. California, that “[s]uch testing procedures plain-
ly constitute searches of ‘persons.’” 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
 34 See Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967) (stat-
ing that only in specifically defined subsets of cases is a search without a warrant reasonable); see also 
Jason E. Zakai, Note, You Say Yes, but Can I Say No?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 421, 424–26 (2008) (delin-
eating several exceptions to the default rule finding warrantless searches unreasonable). 
 35 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
829 (2002) (recognizing the special needs test); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 
(1990) (stating that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does not apply where an individual 
gives voluntary consent); Zakai, supra note 34, at 424–25 (explaining the consent exception to war-
rantless searches under the Fourth Amendment). A third recognized exception exists when exigent 
circumstances necessitate a warrantless search because time does not allow for an official to obtain a 
warrant. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013) (explaining the exigent circumstances 
exception). 
 36 See Jennifer E. Smiley, Note, Rethinking the “Special Needs” Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug 
Testing of High School Students and the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 811, 814–16 (2001) (explaining the special needs doctrine as it relates to warrantless searches 
and the Fourth Amendment); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–
66 (1989) (applying a balancing test that weighs an individual’s expectation of privacy against the 
government’s articulated special need). 
 37 See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 829–38 (applying the balancing test to mandatory drug testing for 
participation in public middle and high school extracurriculars). In Earls, two students, alongside their 
parents, challenged their public school’s drug testing policy that required students to submit to urinal-
ysis before participating in extracurricular activities. Id. at 826–27. They argued that the policy violat-
ed their Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 827. The Supreme Court applied the special needs balancing 
test and ultimately held the school’s drug testing policy constitutional. Id. at 830. The Supreme Court 
concluded that the nature of the students’ privacy interests was minimal, especially because they vol-
untarily participated in the extracurricular activities. Id. at 831–32. Next, the Court similarly consid-
ered the nature of the privacy invasion to be minimal because of the procedure by which a school 
administrator or teacher collected the sample, the fact that the samples were largely confidential, as 
well as that the school did not turn over the samples to law enforcement in the event of a positive test. 
Id. at 832–34. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the school possessed a compelling interest in 
preventing drug use among students, with the interest heightened because the school had experienced 
increasing rates of student drug abuse. Id. at 835–37. Where the special needs doctrine applies, the 
traditional requirement of individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment cases need not exist. See 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (reaffirming that reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context does 
not always require individualized suspicion); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 
(1989) (explaining that drug tests of employees absent individualized suspicion does not necessarily 
violate Fourth Amendment protections because “a showing of individualized suspicion is not a consti-
tutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable”); Smiley, supra note 36, at 815 
(tracing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on “reasonableness” in the Fourth Amendment). 
II.-220 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
D. Qualified Immunity 
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for con-
duct falling within their official capacity unless a “reasonable person” recog-
nizes the right as “clearly established.”38 The doctrine has undergone substan-
tial changes since the Supreme Court first established it in the 1970s.39 What 
began as a two-pronged analysis encompassing both subjective and objective 
elements became a single inquiry into “the objective reasonableness of an offi-
cial’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law.”40 So long 
as an official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, 
he or she will be dismissed from the suit.41 The Supreme Court has provided 
little insight into what amounts to a “clearly established” constitutional right, 
leaving it to the lower courts to devise an appropriate standard.42 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that qualified immunity protects gov-
ernment officials’ conduct unless such conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known”); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (creating a 
cause of action where a state actor deprives an individual of constitutional rights). The doctrine arose 
out of a desire to minimize the threat of suit against public officials acting in their official capacity. 
See John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298–1300 (2012) 
(explaining the origin of qualified immunity to provide a better understanding of its doctrinal evolu-
tion). Because Michigan’s statute mandates screening, and thereby may involve state-sponsored ac-
tors, the defendants invoked the doctrine of qualified immunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (making ac-
tionable claims against state actors); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5431 (requiring screenings by health 
officials); Kanuszewski I, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 720 (describing the defendants’ invocation of qualified 
immunity). 
 39 Williams, supra note 38, at 1299–1300 (identifying two cases, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232 (1974) and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), as the origins of the qualified immunity 
doctrine); John C. Jefferies, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 852 
(2010) (suggesting that qualified immunity’s journey from a mixed subjective-objective inquiry to its 
current single, objective inquiry resulted from the Supreme Court’s desire to decide more qualified 
immunity cases at earlier stages of litigation). 
 40 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (establishing the standard for adjudicating qualified immunity defens-
es). The Court reasoned that this shift away from a subjective inquiry would better allow the govern-
ment to carry out its duties and resolve claims at the summary judgment stage. Id. Courts do not ex-
amine an official’s “subjective motives” in a qualified immunity analysis. Williams, supra note 38, at 
1298 (observing that courts apply “an objective test that asks whether the defendant should have 
known that her action violated the plaintiffs’ right”). Harlow additionally provided governmental 
defendants the option of pleading “extraordinary circumstances” to gain qualified immunity. 457 U.S. 
at 819. For further insight into the implications of the Harlow decision, see Williams, supra note 38, 
at 1302–04. 
 41 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (noting that qualified immunity constitutes an “im-
munity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability”); Williams, supra note 38, at 1298 (providing a 
broad overview of qualified immunity). 
 42 See Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 123 HARV. L. REV. 272, 278 (2009) [hereinafter 
Procedure] (observing that what amounts to a clearly established right has not been clarified); Wil-
liams, supra note 38, at 1299 (noting that whether a court finds a clearly established right depends on 
the jurisdiction and the judge). Williams also highlighted three difficulties courts face in deciding 
whether a right is clearly established: (1) determining how specifically the plaintiff must state the 
allegedly violated right, (2) what sources of law courts may permissibly use to discern the clarity of 
the right, and (3) whether it is ever possible for a right to be clearly established if courts have issued 
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When raised, qualified immunity may operate as a threshold inquiry and a 
court need not decide whether a constitutional violation has occurred before 
dismissing a particular claim.43 Courts may use their discretion in “cases in 
which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far 
from obvious whether in fact there is such a right” to not answer whether a 
constitutional violation has occurred.44 
II. SITUATING THE KANUSZEWSKI II CLAIMS WITHIN NON-CLEARLY 
ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
As discussed in Section I, this Comment will focus on the initial blood 
draws as they relate to two distinct constitutional claims.45 Section A discusses 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Kanuszewski II not to answer 
whether the mandatory initial screening of their newborns violated the parents’ 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.46 Section B examines the separate but related 
decision by the court not to exercise its discretion to answer whether the initial 
                                                                                                                           
conflicting opinions on the matter. Williams, supra note 38, at 1305–14. The Sixth Circuit, in analyz-
ing the viability of a qualified immunity defense, first determines whether a “reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 
1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1994). If the court finds such a right, the inquiry then turns to whether the plain-
tiff pled “non-conclusory allegations” that the officer unreasonably acted in violating the right. Adams 
v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 387 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining pleading standards as “whether plaintiff has 
alleged sufficient facts supported by sufficient evidence to indicate what [the official] allegedly did 
was objectively unreasonable in light of these clearly established constitutional rights”). The Sixth 
Circuit will first consider Supreme Court precedent, then its own case law, and finally other circuits’ 
opinions to decide whether such opinions “placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.” 
Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
741 (2011)). 
 43 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (establishing a new rule that courts may determine on a case-by-
case basis whether to address a constitutional claim). In Pearson, the Court reversed course from its 
earlier decision in Saucier v. Katz. Id.; see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001) (requiring 
courts to examine allegedly violated constitutional right). Under Saucier, courts were required to fol-
low a two-step sequential analysis. 533 U.S. at 201 (noting that an examination of the underlying 
constitutional question “must be the initial inquiry”). A court would first examine whether a constitu-
tional violation occurred, and if so, whether the violated constitutional right was “clearly established.” 
Id. Pearson eliminated the sequential nature of the test, allowing courts to skip an initial inquiry into 
whether a violation occurred and instead only answer whether the allegedly violated right constituted 
a clearly established right. 555 U.S. at 236 (acknowledging that although Saucier’s sequencing may 
be proper in some instances, it should not be mandatory in all instances). 
 44 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237. 
 45 See Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d 396, 415–16, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2019) (separating the constitution-
al claims into, among other categories, those stemming from the initial blood draws relating to the 
parents’ substantive due process rights and those relating to the children’s Fourth Amendment rights). 
In its analysis, the court addressed four additional constitutional claims relating to the infants’ Four-
teenth Amendment rights in connection with the initial blood draws, as well as claims stemming from 
the transfer and retention of the blood. Id. at 413–26. 
 46 See infra notes 48–60 and accompanying text. 
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blood draws violated the infants’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from 
unreasonable searches.47 
A. Declining to Decide the Parents’ Fourteenth Amendment Claims 
In Kanuszewski II, the Sixth Circuit addressed the parents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment claims which stemmed from their asserted fundamental liberty 
interest in directing the care of their children.48 In so doing, the Sixth Circuit 
recognized United States Supreme Court precedent affirming parents’ substan-
tive due process rights to be in charge of their children’s upbringing.49 The 
parents alleged that the defendants violated their substantive due process rights 
when they initially drew their children’s blood.50 The court did not address the 
merits of the parents’ claims and dismissed them under qualified immunity.51 
In declining to exercise its discretion, the Sixth Circuit focused on the fact 
that the Supreme Court has not definitively addressed the extent to which par-
ents’ substantive due process rights include controlling their children’s medical 
care.52 The Sixth Circuit further concluded that the small body of law on this 
topic did not substantially track the parents’ claims.53 Specifically, the court 
noted that the plaintiffs’ reliance on a case addressing parental rights to direct 
their children’s medical care—a 2003 case out of the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.—did not explicitly address the question 
before the Sixth Circuit, and was an out-of-circuit case. 54 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text. 
 48 See Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 415–16. 
 49 See id. at 415 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)) (relying on 
Pierce for the proposition that parents’ substantive due process rights encompass their rights to make 
decisions concerning their children). 
 50 Id. Michigan maintained that the parents erroneously brought their substantive due process 
allegation before the district court because the parents were not the “real parties in interest” and “due 
process rights may not be asserted vicariously.” Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 13, at 33 
(asserting that, because the infants were the named plaintiffs and their parents were just guardians, the 
infants were “the real parties in interest” and could not bring any claims on their parents’ behalf). 
Additionally, Michigan submitted that the court should only address the Fourth Amendment claims 
because, where feasible, the more specific amendment should guide the inquiry. Id. at 31 (citing Cty. 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998)). 
 51 See Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 416 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)) 
(explaining that the complaint did not clearly establish whether the initial blood draws violated the 
parents’ substantive due process “right[s] to direct their children’s medical care”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 415. 
 54 Id. at 415–16; see Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003) (declining 
to decide parents’ claims concerning their fundamental rights to control their children’s medical care 
because of the lack of detailed arguments on appeal resulting from the plaintiffs’ briefs and the district 
court opinion). 
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At issue in Dubbs were physical examinations, including blood draws, 
performed on children in a Head Start program without parental consent.55 In 
reversing the dismissal of the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment claims that the 
physical examinations interfered with their fundamental liberty interest in di-
recting their children’s medical care, the Tenth Circuit focused on the standard 
of review the parents’ claim required.56 The court concluded that the district 
court improperly applied a “shocks the conscience” standard of review to the 
parents’ claims without considering other standards of review for fundamental 
rights.57 Because the lower court did not consider other standards of review, and 
because parents’ rights to direct their children’s medical care plausibly consti-
tutes a fundamental right, the Tenth Circuit remanded this claim for additional 
consideration.58 
Without a relevant case answering whether the initial blood draws consti-
tuted a violation of a fundamental liberty interest similar to a parents’ right to 
control their children’s upbringing, the Sixth Circuit could not clearly identify 
whether Michigan’s mandatory screening program violated the parents’ Four-
teenth Amendment rights.59 The court therefore determined it appropriate to 
grant qualified immunity to the individual defendants without answering wheth-
er the mandatory screening violated the parents’ substantive due process rights.60 
B. Declining to Decide the Children’s Fourth Amendment Claims 
Like with the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Sixth Circuit, in 
addressing the Fourth Amendment claims, held that qualified immunity barred 
any action for damages and declined to answer whether the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits the mandatory drawing of a newborn’s blood for a medical purpose.61 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1197. The physical examinations in Dubbs involved blood pricks as well as 
the children removing their clothing and having their genitalia examined by a nurse without a doctor 
present. Id. at 1199–1200. Except for the bypass of parental consent, the exams largely comported 
with examination standards. Id. at 1200. A Head Start program provides early childhood education to 
children of low-income families. Head Start Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ohs/about/head-start [https://perma.cc/DZ92-LQJH]. 
 56 Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1202–03. 
 57 Id. at 1203. Courts apply a “shocks the conscience” standard of review where plaintiffs allege 
that tortious conduct violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. The Supreme Court has de-
scribed conduct that shocks the conscience as that which “violates the ‘decencies of civilized con-
duct.’” Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998). 
 58 Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1203. 
 59 Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 416. The court noted that even if Dubbs had been directly on point, 
because it fell out of circuit, it would only in “extraordinary cases” result in a clearly established right. 
Id. at 415–16 (citing Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 282 (6th Cir. 2013)). 
 60 Id. at 416. 
 61 Id. at 423. The Sixth Circuit observed that the centrality of medical purposes to Michigan’s 
justifications for its screening program may impact the Fourth Amendment claim. Id. For a suggestion 
that the state may be motivated for reasons other than the health of the child, see Suter, supra note 13, 
at 752–53. 
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In granting qualified immunity for the children’s Fourth Amendment claims, the 
court emphasized the unsettled question of whether the disease-screening na-
ture of the test alters the Fourth Amendment analysis.62 
The court determined that its 2013 decision, Hearring v. Sliwowski, was 
the only applicable circuit case.63 In Hearring, a nurse visually inspected a 
student’s genital area after the student complained of irritation and itchiness.64 
The student’s mother brought suit on her daughter’s behalf and alleged that the 
search violated her daughter’s Fourth Amendment rights.65 Qualified immunity 
barred an action for damages against the nurse because the Fourth Amend-
ment’s reasonableness requirement did not obviously apply to her medical in-
spection.66 Noting that the Hearring court did not reach the underlying consti-
tutional claim, the Sixth Circuit in Kanuszewski II concluded that whether the 
initial blood draws violated the children’s Fourth Amendment rights had not 
been clearly established.67 As such, the Sixth Circuit granted the defendants 
qualified immunity and dismissed them from suit.68 
III. ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL  
CLAIMS IN KANUSZEWSKI II 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in granting qualified immunity, ex-
plicitly elected not to answer whether Michigan’s mandatory newborn screen-
ing program violated the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to control their 
children’s medical care or whether the initial blood draws violated the infants’ 
Fourth Amendment rights.69 As the qualified immunity doctrine stands, the 
Sixth Circuit arrived at the correct conclusion; neither right was so clearly es-
tablished that a medical professional drawing a newborn’s blood would rea-
sonably be aware of the rights’ existence.70 This exercise of discretion, howev-
                                                                                                                           
 62 Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 423 (noting that the Sixth Circuit has not answered “whether draw-
ing blood for the purpose of screening for diseases constitutes a search or seizure for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes”). Michigan argued on appeal that other circuits’ courts of appeal do not find Fourth 
Amendment searches when medical reasons motivate the search. Brief for Defendants-Appellees, 
supra note 13, at 41–42. Michigan argued that the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hearring v. Sliwowski 
stood for the proposition that medically motivated procedures do not constitute searches under the Fourth 
Amendment. 712 F.3d at 282–83 (holding that nurse did not have “fair-warning” that her medical exami-
nation could violate the Fourth Amendment, and providing “no opinion as to whether there was a consti-
tutional violation in this case”); Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 13, at 41–42. 
 63 Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 423; Hearring, 712 F.3d at 281–82.  
 64 Hearring, 712 F.3d at 277–78. 
 65 Id. at 277. 
 66 Id. at 281–82 (holding that, because neither Supreme Court nor out-of-circuit precedent clearly 
established that a school nurse’s medical examination could potentially violate the Fourth Amend-
ment, the school nurse possessed qualified immunity from suit). 
 67 Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 423. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d 396, 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 70 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (establishing the qualified immunity test). 
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er, limits future plaintiffs’ opportunities to succeed in similar constitutional 
challenges.71 If courts continue to decline answering constitutional questions, 
as the Sixth Circuit did in Kanuszewski II, constitutional rights can never be-
come clearly established.72 
The Sixth Circuit should have taken the opportunity to analyze the merits 
of the parents’ Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment claims.73 In order to deter-
mine whether the parents alleged colorable constitutional violations, the Sixth 
Circuit would have needed to look closely at what interest Michigan’s new-
born screening program fulfills, and whether Michigan designed it to narrowly 
achieve that interest.74 This Part animates such analysis, and concludes that 
Michigan’s mandatory screening program is not sufficiently narrowly tailored 
to meet its admittedly compelling interest.75 
In order for the mandatory newborn screening program to pass constitu-
tional muster, Michigan must articulate a compelling interest and a narrowly 
tailored means to achieve that interest.76 Michigan has justified its mandatory 
newborn screening program by stressing its potential life-saving impact on 
newborn infants.77 Undoubtedly, Michigan has a compelling interest in protect-
ing the health and well-being of its infants.78 In protecting the health and well-
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (stating that focusing only on 
whether a right is clearly established does not clarify what constitutes unconstitutional behavior and 
therefore harms plaintiffs as well as governmental officials); Paul Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: 
Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 
429 (2009) (maintaining that the sequencing of Saucier is necessary to establish the contours of a 
constitutional right); see also Procedure, supra note 42, at 277 (predicting that the impact of Pearson 
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2008), would be to focus courts solely on the clearly established prong of 
the qualified immunity defense, instead of considering the underlying constitutional claim). 
 72 See Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 416, 423 (declining to answer whether constitutional violations 
occurred); Procedure, supra note 42, at 282 (stating that an emphasis on whether a right is clearly 
established does not allow parties to orient their future behavior in line with constitutional principles); 
Hughes, supra note 71, at 404, 430 (opining that “constitutional stagnation” may prevent constitution-
al rights from ever being clearly established). 
 73 See Kanuszewski II, 927 F.3d at 416, 423 (declining to answer whether the initial blood screen-
ing in Michigan’s newborn program violated the parents’ fundamental rights to control the medical 
care of their children and the infants’ Fourth Amendment rights). 
 74 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (outlining the standard that the government 
must meet to justify infringing on a fundamental liberty interest). 
 75 See infra notes 76–102 and accompanying text. 
 76 See Reno, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (observing that “unless the [government’s] infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” such infringement violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive due process provision). 
 77 State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, supra note 15 (stating that 
newborn screening programs provide early detection of potentially lethal diseases or disorders and 
thereby facilitate timely and life-saving treatment); see also Michael S. Watson et al., Newborn 
Screening: Toward a Uniform Screening Panel and System—Executive Summary, 117 PEDIATRICS 
S296, S297 (2006) (describing the purpose of states’ newborn screenings as protecting the health of 
infants). 
 78 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (recognizing the state’s 
“legitimate interests” in protecting the life of the fetus). The interest in the life of a fetus logically 
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being of its children through its screening program, Michigan has relied on its 
role as parens patriae, which allows the state to interject itself when parents’ 
decisions “constitute abuse or neglect.”79 
Given Michigan’s compelling interest, the next step is analyzing the me-
chanics of the program itself and whether that process is sufficiently narrowly 
tailored.80 Michigan’s program statutorily mandates screening, and if the screen-
ing returns a positive result, Michigan directs families to “coordinating centers” 
to arrange for further consultation and treatment.81 Michigan’s immediate re-
sponsibility ends at this juncture and the coordinating centers take over.82 
Insofar as Michigan’s direct support ends at screening, one can reasona-
bly argue that Michigan itself neglects the well-being of the infant by not over-
seeing, supporting, or funding the medical treatment following an abnormal 
screening.83 Michigan might argue that its follow-up efforts—communicating 
abnormal screening results to an infant’s healthcare provider and connecting 
families with coordinating centers scattered across the state—sufficiently sup-
port its justification and satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement.84 Yet Michi-
gan impermissibly distances itself by putting the impetus on the coordinating 
centers and primary healthcare providers to facilitate ongoing disease man-
                                                                                                                           
supports the contention that the state has a similar interest in the life of a born child. See id. Specific to 
the newborn screening program, the state’s role as parens patriae allows it to act for the benefit of the 
child. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (explaining the parens patriae doctrine). 
 79 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 263, 265 (1984) (“[I]f parental control falters, the State must 
play its part as parens patriae.”); Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 13, at 36 (citation omit-
ted) (noting the state’s enhanced authority to interject itself with issues involving minors); Suter, su-
pra note 13, at 750–51 (describing situations in which a state can use its parens patriae powers to 
direct a child’s medical care). Paradigmatic of the state relying on its inherent parens patriae power to 
counteract potentially abusive or neglectful parental decision-making is where parents refuse blood 
transfusions or chemotherapy for their children. Suter, supra note 13, at 750–51. As applied to Michi-
gan’s newborn screening program, Michigan’s reliance on its innate parens patriae power presumes 
that some parents would neglectfully or abusively not allow screening of their newborns. See id. at 
751. 
 80 See Reno, 507 U.S. at 302 (requiring both a compelling interest and narrowly tailored means); 
supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text (laying out Michigan’s compelling interest in protecting the 
health and well-being of its citizens). 
 81 Newborn Screening Advisory and Medical Management Groups, MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., https://www.michigan.gov//mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-73971_4911_4916-233589—,00.
html [https://perma.cc/W98M-HCXZ]. 
 82 Id. (providing that “the coordinating centers are responsible” for follow-up medical care) (em-
phasis added). 
 83 See Suter, supra note 13, at 752–53 (noting that states do not typically provide treatment for 
children with screened-for diseases, calling into question their motives). Michigan’s newborn screen-
ing informational pamphlet recognizes that treatment for these diseases begins early and often lasts an 
individual’s lifetime, but it does not suggest that Michigan itself will oversee that treatment. Michigan 
Newborn Screening, MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Sept. 2017), https://www.michigan.
gov/documents/newborn_screening_broc_110897_7.pdf. [https://perma.cc/K5MX-V8LT]  
 84 See id. (stating that if an infant receives a positive screening, the newborn screening follow-up 
program will notify that infant’s primary healthcare provider). 
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agement, which includes conclusive diagnostic testing.85 This means that 
Michigan, in effect, removes itself from the process before it definitively 
knows whether an infant has a disorder.86 To the extent Michigan’s program 
fails to ensure the well-being of infants post-screening, its program is not nar-
rowly-tailored to achieve its purported compelling interest.87 
Statutes can fail the narrowly tailored inquiry if they are so “under-
inclusive” that they do not adequately satisfy a compelling interest.88 Here, 
Michigan’s newborn screening program is under-inclusive.89 Simply telling 
parents that their infant might have a disorder does not properly advance Mich-
igan’s compelling interest in protecting the health and well-being of its newest 
citizens.90 Indeed, Michigan’s lack of direct involvement in subsequent diag-
nostic testing and treatment suggests that protecting the health and well-being 
of newborns may not be its actual or sole interest.91 Governmental interests 
other than newborns’ well-being would implicate a court’s analysis of parents’ 
Fourteenth Amendment claims because an identified compelling interest is 
required to assess, and pass, strict scrutiny.92 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Isabel Hurden et al., Michigan Newborn Screening Program Annual Report 2017, MICH. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 8, 11 (Mar. 2019), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/
mdhhs/Annual_Report2017_final_650647_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/FAR2-7Z9J][(describing the refer-
ral process for infants with abnormal screenings to confirm the results).  
 86 See id. For further discussions of the implications of inconclusive screenings, see Suter, supra 
note 13, at 741–42 (discussing false-positive screenings extensively and noting their harmful impacts 
on infants and their families). 
 87 See Reno, 507 U.S. at 302 (stating that for an infringement of a fundamental right to pass strict 
scrutiny, there must be a narrowly tailored means to achieving a compelling state interest). 
 88 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 448–49 (2015) (noting that a statute’s under-
inclusivity can call into question a government’s compelling interest). Under-inclusivity of a statute 
leading to failure of a narrowly-tailored test often arises with equal protection claims. See Equal Pro-
tection, supra note 28, at 1084 (explaining that under-inclusion arises where a state’s permissible aim 
does not equally assist or hinder “similarly situated” people, occasionally being “so arbitrary as to 
deny equal protection”). Although the constitutional issue in Kanuszewski II is not an equal protection 
claim, the underlying concept of under-inclusivity—that a statute is not sufficiently narrowly tailored 
to achieve its purported interest—is useful in understanding this Comment’s argument. See Smith v. 
Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1979) (concluding, in the context of privacy for juvenile 
criminal offenders, that an under-inclusive statute failed to further a compelling interest when chal-
lenged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).  
 89 See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (describing Michigan’s newborn screening stat-
ute and arguing that it is under-inclusive). 
 90 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (addressing potential harms of screening programs). 
 91 See Wylie Burke et al., Genetic Screening, 33 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 148, 151–52 (2011) (rec-
ognizing that the expansion of screened-for disorders may suggest additional government interests, 
such as improving research capabilities for the government or “inform[ing] future reproductive deci-
sions,” and noting concerns regarding the mandatory nature of newborn screening programs in light of 
this); see also Suter, supra note 13, at 753 (suggesting that states may have other interests, besides the 
health and well-being of the infants, for mandating newborn screening); cf. Smith, 443 U.S. at 104–05 
(1979) (holding that an under-inclusive statute failed to further the government’s compelling interest). 
 92 See Reno, 507 U.S. at 301–02 (identifying compelling interest as requisite element of strict 
scrutiny for a substantive due process claim). 
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Similarly, a determination that Michigan’s interest included something 
other than protecting the health and well-being of newborns would impact the 
assessment of the infants’ Fourth Amendment claims.93 As applied, the special 
needs balancing test would include weighing the government’s interest in the 
newborn screening program against the nature of the intrusion and the infants’ 
privacy interests.94 Accordingly, determining the government’s true interest in 
pursuing a newborn screening program is significant.95 
As currently constituted, Michigan’s mandatory newborn screening pro-
gram may not be constitutional.96 Even if Michigan’s true and only interest is 
the health and well-being of newborns, its program fails to actually ensure pos-
itively screened newborns receive the continued follow-up care required to 
facilitate their health and well-being.97 
This is not to say that Michigan should water down its newborn screening 
program.98 Quite the opposite, Michigan’s legislature should go further than 
mandating only screening—it should also oversee the ongoing medical care 
and treatment for infants with disorders discovered by the mandatory screen-
ing.99 Without formalized state oversight, families lacking educational or fi-
nancial resources might not pursue treatment for a disorder.100 Moreover, state 
governments have not hesitated to forcefully insert themselves into the realm 
of parent-child medical decisions in other arenas, notably vaccinations.101 Fi-
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989) (recognizing gov-
ernmental interest as component of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence where the “special needs” bal-
ancing test applies). 
 94 See id. (articulating the appropriate balancing test for Fourth Amendment cases involving the 
special needs doctrine). 
 95 See id. (identifying the importance of the governmental interest in applying the special needs 
doctrine balancing test). 
 96 See Reno, 507 U.S. at 301–02 (requiring any infringement on a fundamental right to be narrow-
ly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665–66 (including 
governmental interest in the balancing test for determining whether the Fourth Amendment is violated 
when there is a non-law enforcement motivation for a search). 
 97 See Michigan Newborn Screening, MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/newborn_screening_broc_110897_7.pdf (acknowledging that 
treatment can often last for an individual’s lifetime). 
 98 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5431 (2018) (providing statutory requirement for newborn 
screenings but not for follow-up care). For an opposing view that states should instead employ an opt-
in approach to newborn screening programs, see Suter supra note 13, at 789. 
 99 See Michigan Newborn Screening, MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/newborn_screening_broc_110897_7.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ADF7-NJAN] (indicating that Michigan does not directly involve itself in the fol-
low-up of an abnormal screening). 
 100 See Suter, supra note 13, at 752 (noting that the effectiveness of newborn screening programs 
is contingent on a child receiving treatment, which may be based on a family’s economic situation, 
among other factors). But see Watson, supra note 77, at S297 (acknowledging the limits states face in 
providing the follow-up and lifelong medical care associated with some of the screened-for diseases). 
 101 See, e.g., Gina Bellafante, How Far Would You Go to Avoid Vaccinating Your Child?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/nyregion/vaccination-homeschooling-
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nally, requiring Michigan to ensure ongoing treatment for infants with disor-
ders might ensure the constitutionality of the program by solidifying its com-
pelling interest and narrowly tailoring the program to achieve that interest.102 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kanuszewski v. Michigan Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services properly granted defendants qualified 
immunity and dismissed them from a suit alleging that Michigan’s mandatory 
newborn screening program violated infants’ Fourth Amendment rights and 
their parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to direct their children’s medical 
care. In dismissing these claims, the Sixth Circuit canvassed relevant case law 
and determined that no clearly established constitutional rights existed. There-
fore, the court did not address the underlying merits of the constitutional 
claims. The Sixth Circuit should have taken the extra step and examined the 
pertinent constitutional allegations. Analyzing these claims requires examining 
Michigan’s compelling interest and whether the mandatory newborn screening 
program is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Michigan has justified its 
newborn screening program because of its interest in the health and well-being 
of its newest citizens, yet this program is under-inclusive and therefore not 
narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. Michigan’s direct involvement ends 
before there has been a definitive diagnosis. Simply knowing that an infant 
might have a disorder does not equate to a means narrowly tailored to ensure 
an infant’s health and well-being. This brings into question Michigan’s true 
interest in newborn screening and implicates any subsequent analysis of the 
infants’ and parents’ Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment claims. Michigan 
should bolster its newborn screening program and oversee the later stages of 
diagnosis and treatment to achieve its stated purpose of effectively ensuring 
the health and well-being of its newborns. 
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